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The defendant was indicted for the violation of an ordinance regu-
lating the operation of taxi cabs, and by amendment at the trial the com-
plete terms of the ordinance were incorporated in the warrant. The
jury returned a special verdict finding "that the defendant committed
the acts prohibited by the ordinance, as set out in the amendment to
the warrant". The trial court ruled that the ordinance was void and
adjudged the defendant not guilty. On appeal by the State the judg-
ment was reversed on the ground that the special verdict was fatally
defective due to its failure to find the facts essential to an adjudication
of the defendant's guilt or innocence.1
"A special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts only,
leaving the judgment to the court,' 2 and in criminal cases the State may
appeal from a judgment of not guilty entered upon a special verdict.8
It has been declared that the return of a general or a special verdict
is optional *ith the jury,4 but in the final analysis the trial court has
control of the "option," since it may refuse to accept a special verdict
and insist that the jury return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. 5
However, if received, the special verdict is defective if a material finding
is omitted,0 if the findings are contradictory,7 if the findings are merely
a statement of the evidence,8 or if the form of the verdict is otherwise
improper.9 No judgment may be entered upon a verdict defective in
' State v. Gulledge, 207 N. C. 374, 177 S. E. 128 (1934). The trial court based
its decision upon the authority of a previous case, State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C.
644, 175 S. E. 142 (1934), in which this ordinance had been declared uncon-
stitutional.2 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §585.
IN . C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4649. See State v. Lane, 78 N. C. 547
(1878) (rule before the statute was adopted). But cf. State v. Padgett, 82 N.
C. 544 (1880) (the state cannot appeal from a ruling of the trial court setting
aside a special verdict even though the court subsequently enters a judgment
of not guilty).
'See State v. Moore, 29 N. C. 228 (1847) ; State v. Holt, 90 N. C. 749, 47
Am. Rep. 544 (1884) ; State v. Stewart, 91 N. C. 566 (1884). See also the dissent
of Connor, J., State v. Leeper, 146 N. C. 655, 674, 61 S. E. 585 (1908) ("Again,
it is elementary that a defendant, after joining issue, is entitled to a general
verdict unless the jury of their own motion find a special verdict.").
'State v. Colonial Club, 154 N. C. 177, 69 S. E. 771 (1910).
'State v. Curtis, 71 N. C. 56 (1874) ; State v. Crump, 104 N. C. 763, 10 S. E.
468 (1889); State v. Bradley, 132 N. C. 1060, 44 S. E. 122 (1903); State v.
McCloud, 151 N. C. 730, 66 S. E. 568 (1909) ; State v. Barber, 180 N. C. 711,
104 S. E. 760 (1920).
"The special verdict must find unequivocally and explicitly all the material facts
that might warrant the court in adjudging the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant." State v. Yount, 110 N. C. 597, 15 S. E. 231 (1892). It is defective if the
court must supply a single fact or draw the slightest inference. State v. Bray,
89 N. C. 480 (1883) ; State v. Allen, 166 N. C. 265, 80 S. E. 1075 (1914).
'State v. White Oak River Corp., 111 N. C. 661, 16 S. E. 331 (1892).
I State v. Watts, 32 N. C. 369 (1849) ; State v. Hanner, 143 N. C. 632, 57
S. E. 154 (1907) ; State v. Fenner, 166 N. C. 247, 80 S. E. 970 (1914).
'A special verdict which does not include the following statement, or words
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any of these particulars, ° and the trial court may instruct the jury to
retire and correct the error, or it may grant a new trial."1 If the trial
court errs by entering judgment upon a defective verdict the appellate
court will order a venire de novo,12 but if the court errs as a matter of
law in judging the defendant to be guilty or not guilty the case will be
remanded for the entry of the proper adjudication.18 If the jury returns
a special verdict and fails to make a finding concerning one of several
offenses charged the court must declare the defendant not guilty on
that particular count.' 4
After the trial judge has decided whether the facts found by the
special verdict do or do not constitute the offenses charged it is not
necessary that he instruct the jury to render a verdict in accordance with
his decision, although such a procedure was once required and is not
now improper.' 5 It is sufficient that the judgment of the court be
entered upon the special verdict. Following a plea of not guilty the
submission of an agreed statement of facts, even with the consent of
the defendant's attorney, in order that the court without a jury might
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused is not proper,' 0 and
the decision of the court is not a special verdict.17
In the principal case if the trial court had realized the inadequacy
to -the same effect, is defective in form: "If, upon said facts, the defendant is
guilty, the jury then finds him guilty. If, upon said facts he is not guilty, the
jury finds him not guilty." State v. Wallace, 25 N. C. 195 (1842) ; State v.
Stewart, 91 N. C. 566 (1884) ; State v. Divine, 98 N. C. 778, 4 S. E. 477 (1887).
But cf. State v. Scott, 142 N. C. 602, 55 S. E. 270 (1906).
" State v. Lowry, 74 N. C. 121 (1876) ; State v. Bray, 89 N. C. 480 (1883) ;
State v. McCloud, 151 N. C. 730, 66 S. E. 568 (1909).
U State v. Oakley, 103 N. C. 408, 9 S. E. 575 (1889).
' State v. Curtis, 71 N. C. 56 (1874) ; State v. Blue, 84 N. C. 807 (1881) ;
State v. Finlayson, 113 N. C. 628, 18 S. E. 200 (1893) ; State v. Barber, 180 N.
C. 711, 104 S. E. 760 (1920).
"' State v. Robinson, 116 N. C. 1047, 21 S. E. 701 (1895) ; State v. Ditmore, 177
N. C. 592, 99 S. E. 368 (1919); State v. Winston, 194 N. C. 243, 139 S. E.
240 (1927).
"4 State v. Fisher, 162 N. C. 550, 77 S. E. 121 (1913).
' At one time it was considered a reversible error for the trial judge to fail to
instruct the jury to render a verdict in accordance with his decision of the defend-
ant's guilt or innocence. State v. Stewart, 91 N. C. 566 (1884) ; State v. Morris,
104 N. C. 837, 10 S. E. 454 (1889) ; State v. Moore, 107 N. C. 770, 12 S. E. 249
(1890). However, this requirement has been overruled as superfluous, and it is
now proper for the court to enter the judgment upon the special verdict without
requiring a further verdict by the jury. State v. Ewing, 108 N. C. 755, 13 S.
E. 10 (1891); State v. Spray, 113 N. C. 686, 18 S. E. 700 (1893); State v.
Gillikin, 114 N. C. 832, 19 S. E. 152 (1894).
" The submission of an agreed statement of facts for determination by the court
sitting without a jury is a violation of the constitutional principle that in a crimi-
mat case all facts must be found by -the jury. State v. Wells, 142 N. C. 590, 55
S. E. 210 (1906) ; State v. Allen, 166 N. C. 265, 80 S. E. 1075 (1914) ; State v.
Straughn, 197 N. C. 691, 150 S. E. 330 (1929).
" State v. Holt, 90 N. C. 749 (1884). But cf. State v. Davis, 159 N. C. 455, 74
S. E. 916 (1912) (for the purpose of the appeal the court treats the submission
of an agreed statement of facts as a special verdict).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the findings as a special verdict it might have considered their sub-
stance and very logically have treated them as a general verdict of
guilty. In which event the invalidity of the ordinance would have been
a proper basis for an arrest of the judgment.1 8 However, speaking
from authority rather than logic the decision of the principal case is
not open to criticism because the finding of facts was palpably insuffi-
cient to support any judgment.
As a device the special verdict has its defects and has been subjected
to attack. 19 The underlying theory of relieving the jury of applying
the law to the facts is good, but the technical requirements of exactness
and precision have caused trouble.20  The favorable features of the
special verdict have been retained and the objections countered by the
procedure of submitting special interrogatories which the jury must
answer in addition to their duty of returning a general verdict. While
this development of the special verdict has been used extensively in civil
actions, it has met with approval in only a few criminal cases.21 There
is a statute in North Carolina authorizing the use of these special ques-
tions in civil cases,2 but the Supreme Court has indicated an unfortu-
nately hostile attitude toward their employment in criminal prosecu-
tions.23
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' A convicted defendant may move to arrest judgment if the matter charged is
not a criminal offense. State v. Turner, 170 N. C. 701, 86 S. E. 1019 (1915).
Certainly the violation of an unconstitutional ordinance after it had been declared
void would not be a criminal offense.
The repeal of a statute pending a prosecution for an offense created under it
withdraws all authority to pronounce judgment, and a motion in arrest of judg-
ment is proper. State v. Long, 78 N. C. 571 (1878); State v. Williams, 97 N. C.
455, 2 S. E. 55 (1887). By analogy the judicial decision that a statute is uncon-
stitutional should have the same effect as the legislative action of repeal.
Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 253.
"At the bottom the special verdict represents a valuable idea, but as put
into operation it has no vitality. To require such excessive exactness of a lay
body, or even of lawyers, in the heat of trial, is to demand the impossible. Such
requirements cramped the life out of the special verdict." Green, A New Develop-
merit in Jury Trial (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 715, 716.
There are nearly sixty cases in the North Carolina Reports in which a special
verdict has been reversed because of some technical defect. Although it is prac-
tically impossible to ascertain the number of cases in which the special verdict
has been used successfully, the large number of reversals indicate that the percentage
of failure would be high.
" State v. McCarty, 210 Iowa 173, 230 N. W. 379 (1930); State v. Wells,
162 S. C. 509, 161 S. E. 177 (1931).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §587-
SThe statute, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §587, has never been con-
strued as applicable or not applicable to a criminal case, but in one opinion, in
speaking of special interrogatories, the court said, "This practice is not to be
advised in criminal cases. It will be found inconvenient and, moreover, it tends
to impair the undoubted rights of juries to find general verdicts, or at least to dis-
courage its exercise." State v. Belk, 76 N. C. 10 (1877).
